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DIALING FOR DOLLARS: COMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION AND ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFER SYSTEMS
THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. LEE*
INTRODUCTION
That this is an appropriate time for discussing the policy options
for EFT development is indicated by the creation last fall of the
National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfer (NCEFT).' The
NCEFT has a two year mandate from Congress to conduct a study
and to recommend appropriate legislative and administrative action in
connection with the development of public and private EFT systems.
The membership of the NCEFT reflects the broad range of interests
affected by EFT systems; beside representatives of the financial in-
dustry and its regulators, the NCEFT will include representatives of
the Postmaster General, the Federal Trade Commission, the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment, and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission. 2
Several federal agencies charged with regulating various sectors
of the banking industry have likewise expressed an interest in EFT
policy, either by official inquiry or initiation of experimental rules. In
November, 1973, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System proposed a set of EFT-related regulations as an amendment
to its Regulation J, which governs the transfer of funds through
Federal Reserve facilities. The same announcement invited com-
ment on broad issues of EFT policy.'
The Federal Reserve System counts as members all national banks,
and the state chartered banks and trust companies that choose to join
by purchasing stock and maintaining a reserve balance in the local
Federal Reserve Bank. The Fed holds an important place in fund
transfer both because its members are in general the larger commercial
banks4 and because the Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Board of
* Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission. Research for this paper
was done by Daniel Prives, Harvard Law School '77, under the supervision of Mr.
Sidney Goldman and with the assistance of the Harvard Program on Information
Technologies and Public Policy. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Communications
Commission.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 201 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1733).
2, Id. § 202(a) (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1733-34).
3. Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Banks, Proposed Transfer of Funds,
38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
4. As of December 31, 1973, member banks accounted for forty percent of all
commercial banks in the United States and for sixty-one percent of all commercial
banking offices, and they held about seventy-seven percent of the total deposits in
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Governors to regulate the transfer of funds through Federal Reserve
Banks, to act as a clearinghouse for fund transfers, and to charge for
the service of clearing funds.5 The Federal Reserve's EFT proposals
and inquiry prompted comments from all sectors of the banking com-
munity - member and non-member commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions - as well
as the Justice Department, the Postal Service, AT&T, and many
other parties. The Fed has yet to announce the policies it will pursue
as a result of the inquiry, but in the meantime has turned down re-
quests to operate EFT systems for a group of banks in Atlanta pend-
ing the outcome of its EFT inquiry and proposed legislation regarding
the NCEFT.0
At the same time, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which
supervises federally chartered savings and loan associations,7 pro-
posed in May, 1974, to extend, consolidate, and expand its "pilot
regulation" of EFT systems to permit further experimentation until
July, 1975.8 Under this regulation, federally chartered savings and
loan associations may maintain electronic "remote service units" to
handle deposits, withdrawals, payments, and transfers among ac-
counts anywhere within the state in which the home office of the
institution lies. 9
The National Credit Union Association, whose authority extends
to federally chartered credit unions,"° also amended its regulations in
August, 1974, to set up a procedure for establishing EFT pilot pro-
grams." Under this broad new rule, any pilot program will be
approved if the NCUA determines that its implementation will pro-
vide it with information helpful in formulating permanent programs
beneficial to federally chartered credit unions.
In December, 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency, responsible
for the administration of national banks, announced an interpretation
commercial banks. State member banks account for eleven percent of the total number
of state-chartered commercial banks, twenty-four percent of the banking offices, forty-
eight percent of the total deposits. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1973, at 254-55 (1974).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970).
6. American Banker, Sept. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
7. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has the authority to charter and super-
vise federal savings and loan associations under the Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (a) (1970).
8. 39 Fed. Reg. 16484, rules adopted as modified, 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.4-2, 545.14-5 (1975)).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2(a), (b) (1975).
10. The National Credit Union Administration charters and governs federal
credit unions under 12 U.S.C. § 1754 (1970).
11. See 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1975).
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of section 36 of the National Bank Act, which limits the authority of
the national banks to establish branches, permitting national banks to
establish "Customer-Bank Communication Terminals" (CBCTs)12
without regard to geographic restrictions."3 The Comptroller's action
was almost immediately challenged by the State of Missouri when the
First National Bank of St. Louis took advantage of the regulation
and installed an automated teller in suburban St. Louis.'
A number of states have also taken steps toward formulating poli-
cies with regard to EFT systems, sometimes by legislative mandate,
sometimes by executive action and judicial decision. At least three
states, Washington, Massachusetts, and Oregon, have already adopted
legislation permitting banks to install remote electronic banking
facilities.' 5
The Massachusetts statute authorizes banks, saving banks, and
savings and loan associations to install and operate remote, unmanned
facilities. The facilities can be shared by any financial institutions, but
12. There is no standard nomenclature in the EFT field at this time. What the
Comptroller of the Currency calls CBCTs are described by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board as "Remote Service Units" or RSUs. CBCTs or RSUs may generally
be classified as "manned" or "unmanned." Unmanned CBCTs are also known as
Automatic Teller Machines (ATM), and should be familiar to most readers as
"Total-Tellers," "24-Hour Tellers," or some similar promotional name.
Manned CBCTs now in use involve a party in addition to the financial
institution and its customer. Typically, such a CBCT is located in a supermarket
and is manned by an employee of the store, the supermarket serving as a financial
and operational intermediary between the customer and the financial institution. Future
manned CBCTs may include devices, known as point-of-sale (POS) terminals, for
direct transfer of funds from a customer's account to a merchant's account. Electronic
cash registers and devices which only perform credit authorization are also described
as POS terminals, but they do not fall into the CBCT category.
"On-line" and "off-line" is another useful distinction among CBCTs, particu-
larly when the impact of communication regulation is involved. An on-line CBCT
is connected by wire to a central computer or computer network, and is continually
polled and updated as transactions occur. An off-line CBCT is either completely
self-contained and records its transactions on tape for periodic removal, or com-
municates with a central computer in a "batch" mode.
13. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974). The Comptroller's ruling is codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7491 (1975). [A recent interpretative ruling by the Comptroller places some
geographic restrictions on the establishment of CBCTs. See 40 Fed. Reg. 21700
(1975), amending 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975) .- Eds.]
14. American Banker, Jan. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 3. The State brought the action
because its branching laws prohibit the establishment of facilities outside of the city
in which the principal office is located.
[On May 28, 1975, a challenge to the installation by a national bank, pursuant
to the Comptroller's ruling, of an unmanned automated teller machine was upheld by
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. State of Colorado
ex rel. State Banking Board v. First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 75-M-397 (D. Colo.,
May 28, 1975).-Eds.]
15. American Banker, Oct. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
19751
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the number of facilities an institution may own or participate in is
limited. Moreover, no institution may own or participate in a remote
unit outside the county in which its main branch lies, a provision
parallel to the state's branching laws.16
The Washington state statute puts no territorial restrictions on
installing remote units, and it makes more extensive provision for
sharing remote facilities. A commercial bank that wishes to install a
remote automated facility must share the facility with other com-
mercial banks that will bear a reasonable share of the costs. The
statute permits other financial institutions to share facilities with each
other or with commercial banks, but sharing is not mandatory for
them. 17
Other states have taken a more restrictive stance toward EFT
systems. For example, in State ex rel. Meyer v. American Community
Stores,' the Nebraska Attorney General recently argued that an EFT
system using terminals in a Hinky Dinky supermarket operated by the
store's employees violated that state's banking laws, an argument re-
jected by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
The EFT options advanced by the private sector are too numer-
ous to list; however, one of the major conflicts at this point revolves
around the desirability of co-operative development of EFT systems.
Four New York banks, Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust Co., Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co., and Chemical Bank, have already agreed
to operate an experimental EFT system using a jointly operated facility
to authorize Master Charge and Bank Americard purchases through
the participating banks.' 9 New York's First National City Bank (Citi-
bank) opposes the joint facility concept. Citibank has developed its
own credit card system and advocates absolutely competitive develop-
ment of EFT systems. 20
Finally on this list of options on the EFT agenda is an option
closer to the traditional concerns of the FCC. In March, 1974, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) requested that savings
and loan associations tinder its jurisdiction, as well as other financial
institutions, be exempted from a regulation dealing with attachment
of non-telephone company equipment to telephone company lines. 21
A rule of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission requires certification
16. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, § 65 (Supp. 1974).
17. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.43.010-30.43.040 (Supp. 1974).
18. 193 Neb. 634, 228 N.W.2d 299 (1975).
19. American Banker, Sept. 25, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
20. American Banker, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
21. Letter from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to the Corporation Com-
mission of Oklahoma, Mar. 28, 1974.
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for all telephone company customers who wish to connect their facilities
to the telephone network, unless they comply with all telephone com-
pany rules regarding connection of equipment."2 The FHLBB re-
quested the exemption on the grounds that the various banking regu-
latory agencies have overriding authority over bank-related systems
under the laws that created these agencies, and secondly, that the use
of communication facilities is merely ancillary to the banks' primary
business, and thus beyond the purview of communications regulation.23
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission's rule is but one instance
of a much broader policy debate over the question whether customers
can connect their own equipment to telephone company lines. This
debate has been complicated by a jurisdictional clash between the
FCC and state agencies which regulate the telephone system, as exem-
plified by the conflicting rules between the North Carolina Utilities
Commission and the FCC which led to .the Telerent case.24 The
FHLBB was properly concerned that this so-called interconnection
issue could have serious consequences for the spread of EFT systems.
The list of EFT proposals and regulations from the banking
agencies, from the states, and from the banking industry amply demon-
strates that there are many options and models for developing the social
and legal support system for future fund transfer mechanisms. Con-
sideration of EFT systems as communication systems is an option and
a model which has received little attention. This article describes the
direct and the indirect influence of communication regulation on EFT
systems. The first consideration is whether the FCC can and should
exert direct authority over EFT systems. While it appears that the
FCC would describe many EFT services as, "hybrid communication
systems" under the principles established by the FCC in its Computer
Inquiry,2 5 the drawbacks involved in FCC, regulation are substantial,
and, it will be argued, the FCC should thus forbear from exercising
authority over EFT systems. It is suggested that for the present, the
substance of communication regulation might, by analogy be adopted
by regulatory bodies other than the FCC as a means for regulating
access to EFT systems. The final section of this article concerns the
indirect influence of communication regulation of EFT systems which
22. See Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, 225 (1974).
23. Letter from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to the Corporation Com-
mission of Oklahoma, Mar. 28, 1974.
24. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 104 (1974).
25. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Final Decision
and Order, 1971), 28 F.C.C2d 291 (Tentative Decision, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Computer Inquiry].
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arises because EFT systems may involve interconnection of non-tele-
phone company communication systems to the telephone network. The
status of the interconnection issue before the FCC has an impact on
the kind of EFT systems that can eventually be adopted.
A COMMUNICATION VIEW OF EFT SERVICES
Is an EFT system a communication system of the sort ordi-
narily within FCC common carrier jurisdiction? The answer to this
question depends on the technology of the system and its function.
First, the FCC has jurisdiction only over communication systems that
employ wire or broadcast electronic communication.26 Secondly, in
addition to the technology requirement, a system must possess the
functional characteristics of a communications common carrier.2
Whether or not a function of a system is communication common car-
riage is hardly a simple determination. The authors of the Communi-
cations Act forced the concept of common carriage from the trans-
portation field into a communications mold.28  At common law, the
transportation common carrier holds himself out for hire by anyone,
accepts control over the goods he carries, and thus assumes the re-
sponsibility of an insurer. In contrast, a communication common carrier
does not insure the accuracy of its messages; instead, because communi-
cations is such an essential function with characteristics of a natural
monopoly, common carrier regulation of a communication service is
supposed to insure that all have access to the service on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis at fair rates.
The Communications Act sheds no light on the nature of com-
munication common carriage. Its definition is framed in terms of the
26. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). For some purposes, the technology of the com-
munication system is enough to establish FCC jurisdiction. For example, a microwave
facility must be licensed as a radio facility no matter what messages it carries.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
28. The telephone and telegraph companies were first included as federally regu-
lated common carriers in 1910 through an amendment to the Mann-Elkins Act,
which itself amended the Interstate Commerce Act. Both sponsors of the bill spoke
against the amendment, which would regulate communications as common carriers.
Nevertheless, the concept stuck, and no changes were made when authority over
communications common carriers was vested in the FCC by the Communications
Act of 1934. See Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of Functions
and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. Com. B.J. 161,
204-06 (1974).
The legislative history of the 1934 act provides little insight: "'It is to be
noted that the definition [of common carrier] does not include any person not a
common carrier in the ordinary sense of the term .... '" Id. at 206, quoting H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1933).
DIALING FOR DOLLARS
common law concept, which, as noted above, was not applied to com-
munication. Consequently, the FCC has had to define the functions
that fall within the term "communication common carriage." As an
expert agency, the FCC has been accorded considerable latitude in
establishing the base of its jurisdiction.29 The term "communications
common carrier" ordinarily applies when there is a public offering to
provide facilities for transmission of communication."0
The most recent consideration of the line between what is and
what is not within the ambit of FCC authority lies in the Computer
Inquiry, wherein the FCC sought to delineate the areas of the com-
puter services market which constitute communication common car-
riage. In the Computer Inquiry, the FCC first determined that it
should not regulate the function of data processing. It found that the
,data processing services industry was sufficiently competitive to elimi-
nate the need for regulation and that regulatory constraints would in-
hibit flexibility in development and thus would be contrary to the
public interest. 3' On the other hand, regulatory jurisdiction was ex-
tended to computer services which are "essentially communications.""
Defining the computer services that constitute "data processing"
proved difficult, however, since the present state of computer technology
makes possible such communication functions as routing messages
from one computer terminal connected with a central computer to
another, the so-called "message switching" function, in addition to
data processing.83 Thus, the FCC had to sort out the communication
29. See Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
30. Fundamental to the concept of a communications common carrier is that such
a carrier holds itself out or makes a public offering to provide facilities by wire
or radio whereby all members of the public who chose to employ such facilities
and to compensate the carriers therefore may communicate or transmit intelligence
of their own design and choosing ....
Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958) (footnote omitted). See also
Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of Functions and the Role of the
Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. CoM. B.J. 161, 204-08 (1974).
31. 28 F.C.C.2d at 278 (Final Decision and Order), 297-98 (Tentative Decision).
The FCC declined to decide whether its jurisdiction in fact extends to data processing
services as such. 28 F.C.C2d at 268 (Final Decision and Order).
32. 28 F.C.C.2d at 278 (Final Decision and Order).
33. "Message switching" is to be distinguished from "circuit switching" which
involves the creation of a physical link between the communicating parties. In message
switching, the transmission of data involves a very brief period of storage of data
within the computer while it searches for an available line to send the message to
its destination, and there is never a physical link between the lines from the sender
and the lines of the receiver. For purposes of regulation, message switching is defined
as "the computer-controlled transmission of messages, between two or more points,
via communications facilities, wherein the content of the messages remains unaltered."
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2) (1974).
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function, which it continued to regulate, from the data processing
function, which it decided not to regulate. The Commission employed
a principle that is easier to state than to apply: If a service includes
communications functions incidental to its data processing service, it
is a "hybrid data processor" and is not subject to regulation as a com-
munication entity; if, however, the service employs data processing as
incidental to what appears to be a communication service, then it is a
"hybrid communication service" subject to FCC jurisdiction. In the
words of the Computer Inquiry:
[W]here message-switching is offered as an integral part of and
as an incidental feature of a package offering that is primarily
data processing, there will be total regulatory forebearance with
respect to the entire service .... 34
EFT Systems as Communication Common Carriers
An EFT service, to constitute a "hybrid communication service,"
must use a regulated technology and must serve more of a communi-
cation function than a data processing function. First, the system
must employ electronic transmission of data. Perhaps from a logical
standpoint the function that a system performs should be more rele-
vant to its regulatory status than the technology by which the function
is accomplished, but the technology of the system, under the Com-
munications Act, is a controlling factor. Thus, if two EFT systems
having identical functions differ in that one system sends its message
by wire and the other by hand-delivering magnetic tapes, the FCC
could only regulate the former, no matter how reasonable it would be
for the FCC to regulate also the latter. 5
Second, laying aside the question of technology, an EFT system
must perform primarily a communication function as opposed to a
data processing function, to be subject to FCC regulation, a determi-
nation which can only be made by evaluating the functions of a par-
ticular EFT system. An example of an EFT system which would
constitute a hybrid communication service involves a communication
system among Automated Clearing Houses (ACHs) . 6 An ACH
makes it possible for a large business to distribute its payroll merely
34. 28 F.C.C.2d at 305 (Tentative Decision).
35. The dependence of FCC jurisdiction on an accident of technology represents
a fatal weakness of the Communications Act in dealing with EFT systems. This
weakness could be avoided in the future by focusing on the functions of fund transfer
systems rather than on the technology they employ.
36. ACHs have already been established in a number of areas, including Cali-
fornia, Atlanta, Boston, and Minneapolis. None, to my knowledge, uses the particular
type of wire transfer described.
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by sending its bank a magnetic tape containing the names of its em-
ployees, their banks, and the amounts of their paychecks. The em-
ployer's bank culls the information on the tape regarding the employees
who happen to have accounts at that bank and sends the rest of the
information to the local ACH. The ACH collates this information
with information from its other member banks and sends it to its desti-
nation, which may be another local member of the ACH or another
ACH in a different locality.
Data processing is involved in the ACH system described above.
First, data is rearranged to allow it to be sent to a member bank or
another ACH. Secondly, the ACH system would presumably debit
and credit its members' clearing house accounts. Finally, the ACH
might perform any of a number of housekeeping functions, such as
checking the format of items, tabulating statistics on amounts flowing
through the system, and so on. However, despite the data processing
that goes on, it appears that the system as a whole is geared to a single
end, transferring paycheck information from the employer's bank to the
employee's bank. The primary purpose of the system thus seems to
be message switching, and as the Computer Inquiry indicates, such an
ACH system could be subject to regulation under the Communica-
tions Act. In fact, if one accepts the proposition that the check-
clearing function of banks is not primarily an adjustment of clearing-
house balances among banks, but is rather a type of communication
among a payee, his bank, the payor's bank, and the payor, then any
system that uses a regulated technology to replace the check-clearing
function will likely constitute a "hybrid communication system" by
the terms of the Computer Inquiry.
On the other hand, there are reasons for FCC abstention in the
regulation of EFT systems, even when those systems involve com-
munication functions. The principle upon which such abstention might
be based is contained in the Computer Inquiry. In determining the
exercise of its common carrier jurisdiction, the FCC has indicated
an intention to restrict regulation to those areas where such "factors
are present to require governmental intervention to protect the public
interest because a potential for unfair practices exists."37 In the area
of data processing, as indicated above, the Commission decided to
abstain because it found that the provision of services was essentially
competitive and that, therefore, the public interest did not require
regulation. 8
37. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297 (Tentative Decision).
38. Id. at 297-98.
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In the area of electronic transfer of funds, the FCC might likewise
deem that it not be in the public interest to assert regulatory jurisdic-
tion on systems intimately related to banking. Such a decision could
be based on several grounds.
First, because the FCC's authority is limited to EFT systems
that employ communication by wire, the impact of EFT regulation
would be reduced and could produce distortions in the kinds of EFT
systems that are designed. A cost of exercising authority would be the
possibility that new EFT systems would be designed to take advantage
of FCC authority or to avoid it, possibly resulting in less efficient
systems. On the other hand, the benefit of FCC regulation would not
be great if a large number of systems are exempt from it. Thus, the
FCC might better refrain entirely from regulating.
Secondly, because EFT systems are already regulated by banking
agencies, FCC regulation in the area would be redundant and con-
fusing. The Commission decided that data processing should not be
regulated because the market provided adequate regulation; similarly,
it might determine that banking agencies provide adequate regulation.
The check-clearing function is under the authority of the Federal
Reserve System,89 and it has used this authority to regulate transfers
by wire since the inception of the Fedwire in the 1920's. The FCC
might continue to rely on the Federal Reserve to regulate EFT sys-
tems. In addition, Congress has given the NCEFT authority to in-
vestigate future developments in EFT systems and to recommend legis-
lation and administrative action." In light of Congress' evident intent
that the EFT situation be studied as a whole, an independent EFT
study by the FCC would be repetitive. Thus, between existing regula-
tion of the clearing house function of commercial banks and Congres-
sionally authorized study of EFT systems, the FCC might decide to
take a hands-off attitude toward EFT.
Thirdly, because a few EFT systems might not be found to offer
a service to the public, regulation may not be necessary. Some EFT
systems, for example, are concerned only with the internal operations
of banks. The present Bankwire system, which is used in the transfer
of large amounts among the banks belonging to the system, is such a
system. When it is unlikely that the public interest will be affected
by the operation of an EFT system, such as in the case of Bankwire,
the FCC might eschew regulation. In the case of the ACH system
described earlier, and with other systems that propose funds transfer
39. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970). See also Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve
Banks, Proposed Transfer of Funds, 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
40. Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 203(a) (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1734-35).
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from the point of sale, it would be more difficult to make a convincing
argument that the systems do not involve a public offering of service
such as to eliminate the need for FCC regulation. Thus, in only a few
cases could the FCC decide to exercise its discretion not to regulate
on grounds that the systems do not involve the public interest.
The status of EFT systems as communication common carriers
under FCC jurisdiction thus falls into two issues: whether EFT
systems are communication or data processing systems and whether
the FCC should regulate banking systems in the EFT area. The first
issue can be resolved in favor of communication regulation for most
EFT systems. On the other hand, the FCC might make several argu-
ments for exercising its discretion not to regulate: that its jurisdiction
over EFT would be incomplete because of its technological limitations,
that EFT systems are under sufficient administrative scrutiny already,
and that some EFT systems have an insignificant effect on the public
interest. This is not to say that the FCC would never decide to regu-
late an EFT system. At this point, however, communication regula-
tion of EFT systems by the FCC is a remote possibility.
Common Carrier Regulation as a Model
for EFT Regulation
Although the FCC probably will not attempt to regulate EFT
systems, it is reasonable to ask whether the policies that lie behind
communication regulation are relevant to issues that EFT systems
have raised. One area in which EFT regulation might benefit from
experience with communication regulation is in the area of access
to EFT systems. In the Federal Reserve's inquiry into EFT systems,
one of the major questions asked was whether non-members of the
Federal Reserve should be allowed access to any EFT system operated
by the Federal Reserve, and if so, at what cost.4'
Access is also an issue in the development of ACHs. The original
rules of the California ACH would have permitted access only to
commercial banks, but current rules in most, if not all, ACHs permit
thrift institutions to participate indirectly in the system through a rela-
tionship with a commercial bank member.42 And access is a prominent
issue in the development of remote service units and point-of-sale
systems. For instance, the Washington state EFT statute requires
41. See 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
42. E.g., New England Automated Clearing House Association Operating Rules.
It has been announced that the New York Automated Clearing House will permit
direct access by thrift institutions when it opens this summer. American Banker,
Jan. 27, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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that commercial banks share their facilities with other commercial
banks when requested to do so.
4 3
Access is an important issue in EFT systems because small banks
and financial institutions may not have the resources to create such
systems even on a shared basis, and because, in some cases, more than
one customer facility (e.g., an automated teller machine) in a location
may be impractical. The marketing potential of EFT services makes
it imperative that small institutions be permitted to participate if they
are to survive. The analogy to communication common carriers is
strong: communication common carrier regulation is intended to in-
sure that all parties have equal access to the resources of communica-
tion channels which are limited by physical characteristics (e.g., to
be able to call anyone else, all telephones have to be connected with
each other). Similarly, EFT systems represent a potentially important
resource limited by such characteristics as economies of scale, which
may create natural monopolies, and the fact that only so many re-
mote service units can fit in a given amount of space.
The concept of common carriage is one model for implementing
a policy that all financial institutions or all institutions of a certain
type (commercial banks, savings and loan associations, etc.) should
participate in EFT systems on an equal basis. The elements of com-
mon carrier regulation relevant to EFT systems are a public filing
of the terms under which parties may participate in an EFT system
and a procedure for reviewing the terms and modifying them if they
are unfair or discriminatory. Under the Communications Act, com-
munication carriers must file the charges for using their facilities, and
the rules governing such use, with the FCC. The Commission may
suspend a new charge for up to three months while it investigates,
and may declare any charge or regulation of the carrier to be in viola-
tion of the Communications Act." The rate filing and review system
provided by the Communications Act does not depend on the rate-of-
return method of rate-setting that has been adopted for those common
carriers that happen to be regulated monopolies; while all carriers
must file rates with the FCC, not all are subject to rate-of-return regu-
lation. Thus, in regulating access to EFT systems, an agency interested
in EFT systems might establish among its experimental policies a
procedure to sytematize access to EFT projects, using as a model the
tariff-filing procedure of communications regulatory agencies, an option
not inconsistent with free competition in EFT experiments.
43. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.43.030 (Supp. 1974).
44. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 204 (1970).
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Of course, the common carrier model is not the only possibility
for enforcing access to EFT systems. A principle of access can also be
found in the interpretation of the antitrust laws, as in the case of
Associated Press v. United States." In the Associated Press case,
the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against AP that had the
effect of opening up the news service's facilities to all newspapers on
an equal basis, regardless of whether another competing newspaper
subscribed to the service in the particular region. The antitrust
model seems, however, to be a cumbersome way to enforce a policy
of access to EFT systems. The number of local and regional EFT
projects that have already been established and the number of parties
who might bring suit for access to the systems suggest that a more
comprehensive method of enforcing access might be necessary.
The best way to summarize the relationship between communica-
tion common carrier regulation and EFT systems is to point out
that the regulation of communication common carriers is a model for
the enforcement of access to EFT systems that seems less cumbersome
and more automatic than a system that relies on the courts or the state
commissioner of finance for enforcement. It is unlikely, however, that
the FCC will be the agent for imposing such a model on EFT sys-
tems. Its ability to regulate only communication by wire and the
ample regulation already present in the banking industry make it a
relatively less effective agent for change in the EFT area.
INTERCONNECTION AND EFT SERVICES
The problem of interconnection affects EFT systems today, as
it affects many industries with specialized communication needs. As
far as the banking industry is concerned, the interconnection and
foreign attachment problem has two faces. At the federal level, there
are remaining interconnection and foreign attachment restrictions.
At the state level, the division of communication authority between
the federal government and the states may stand in the way of elec-
tronic banking services if banking retains a state-oriented marketing
system.
Ten years ago, many EFT systems were inconceivable except
as an extension of telephone service owned and controlled by the tele-
phone companies, because the telephone tariffs prohibited customers
from attaching foreign equipment to standard lines and prohibited
private branch exchanges on leased lines. The Carterfone decision
and its aftermath have changed the outlook on services within the tele-
45. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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phone companies' sole prerogative.46 The relevant tariffs fall into
two categories. Interconnection deals with the attaching of full cus-
tomer communication systems, such as private branch exchanges or
microwave systems, to the telephone networks. Foreign attachment
refers to the use of non-company equipment, such as answering devices,
in connection with the regular telephone networks.
The Carterfone case in 1969 held that the telephone company's
blanket prohibition of all customer-provided equipment was unrea-
sonable and discriminatory without evidence that the telephone net-
work had actually been harmed or would be harmed by the equipment.
The tariff by which AT&T replaced its pre-Carterfone practices set
up technical criteria for interconnection and foreign attachment, re-
quired a telephone company-provided interface of the network, and
required telephone company equipment for "network control signal-
ling," that is, dialing.4 7 A recent modification in the tariff has indi-
cated that the network interface requirement may be eased.4"
The arguments to justify the present allocation of functions be-
tween the telephone company and its customers fall into two categories,
technological and economic. On the technological side, the issues in
Carterfone include the alleged increase in network maintenance costs
due to foreign equipment on the lines, degradation of the switching
operations caused by "foreign" dialers, and increased demand on the
network beyond its design capabilities. The economic issues pri-
marily involve the effect of creating competitive markets in telephone
equipment on the policy of price discrimination and cross-subsidiza-
tion practiced by the phone company and sanctioned by the FCC.
The policy question that arises is whether these general issues apply
with equal force to an EFT system.
The technical issue of maintenance costs and degraded switching
capability does not apply with any special force to the CBCT systems.
Reputable manufacturers of terminals - IBM, NCR, Bunker-Ramo,
Burroughs, Singer and TRW - would dispute the telephone com-
pany's expressed fear that they would not build equipment adequate
to meet reasonable standards of reliability and maintainability.
The other technical issue is whether increased demand created
by interconnected equipment will overburden the telephone network.
46. Use of Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, petition for reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
47. See American Tel. & Tel. Tariff FCC No. 260 sec. 2.6.




Previous developments in computer-communication technology have
caught the telephone companies short on capacity. The explosive
growth of timesharing and remote computer services in the mid-1960s
led to serious disruptions of telephone service in some areas."0 In
major urban areas, the growth of point-of-sale systems could come
in the areas of high computer use, the central business districts. The
FCC might keep close watch on the traffic EFT development may create.
The economic argument against interconnection is based on a
long-standing policy of cross-subsidization practiced by the phone
company. As a regulated monopoly, the telephone company can set
proportionately higher rates for its customers who can pay more, for
example business customers, and use the higher rates to subsidize resi-
dential service. The company alleges that interconnection equipment
manufacturers take advantage of the artificially high prices for busi-
ness equipment, and that the widespread use of interconnected machines
and systems will ultimately produce higher residential telephone rates."
The economic issue does not apply to point-of-sale EFT systems with
the same force as it might affect, say, private switchboard systems.
The telephone companies do not yet have a capital base of point-of-sale
terminals with which to cope. Thus, point-of-sale EFT systems repre-
sent new growth, not a siphoning from the current sources of com-
pany revenues.
In short, the ordinary arguments against interconnection and
foreign attachment in general have little connection with a point-of-
sale EFT system, although it will be necessary to see that CBCT
growth does not overwhelm telephone company capacity. The intra-
connection issue, however, is confused by the fact that communication
regulation in the United States is shared by state and federal agencies.
Under the Communications Act, the authority of the FCC is limited
to regulating interstate and foreign communications by wire. Inter-
state telephone regulation is within the province of a state regulatory
body in 48 states; only two states, Texas and New Mexico, do not
regulate at the state government level.5 ' Ordinarily, this authority is
divided according to whether the service involves interstate transmis-
sion by wire. This distinction, however, ill-fits the telephone network,
which carries interstate and intrastate messages indiscriminately. The
mismatch has led to a conflict between the FCC and state authorities
49. M. IRWIN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 41 (1971).
50. The role of cross-subsidization in the telephone rate structure and arguments
for and against it are summarized in S. MATHISON AND P. WALKER, COMPUTERS
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC POLICY 142-45 (1970).
51. FEDERAL PowER COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION
AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS, AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES 5 (1973).
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on the interconnection and foreign attachment issue, with some states
adopting a more restrictive policy. The banking industry has often
respected state lines, but this conflict of communications jurisdiction
adds to the incentives of the industry to shed the state-boundary re-
strictions when considering the status of EFT systems.
The leading case in the federal-state jurisdictional conflict over
interconnection is the Telerent decision," adopted by the FCC in
January, 1974, and currently on appeal. The case arose when several
states adopted policies toward interconnection and foreign attachments
inconsistent with the FCC's Carterfone decision. The most restrictive
was North Carolina's ruling, which prohibited all connection of cus-
tomer equipment on telephone lines used for intrastate service. Of
course, very few facilities of the telephone company are employed ex-
clusively for interstate use, so the North Carolina Utilities Commis-
sion decision all but abrogated Carterfone in North Carolina.
In Telerent, the FCC made a declaratory ruling that Carterfone
preempted the state's authority in the interconnection area. The de-
cision rests on two grounds. First, the Commission emphasized that
different federal and state interconnection rules cannot be reconciled
with the fact that the telephone plant is used in common for all local
and long distance telephone calls. Thus, Congress' grant of plenary
regulatory power to the Commission must allow it to override an in-
consistent state rule. Secondly, the Commission concluded that the
legislative history of the Communications Act indicates that state power
in the communication field was limited to regulation of rates and serv-
ices, not regulation of hardware. The Commission decided that states
can only adopt interconnection rules not inconsistent with the policies
set forth in Carterfone.
Because almost all telephone machinery is employed for interstate
and intrastate service, Telerent does not answer the question whether
the state has authority over interconnection and foreign attachment if
the device can only be used for intrastate messages. Yet the traditional
structure of banking might put a local EFT system into this curious
classification. For instance, if ATMs were deemed bank branches,
their use across state lines would be prohibited. Then an ATM net-
work would fall into the limbo left by Telerent of a communication
system used for only intrastate messages. Banking regulators might
avoid this eventuality by allowing local EFT systems to cross state
lines. Thus, this aspect of 'communications regulation might be an
added incentive to proceed in that direction.
52. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
Practical difficulties stand in the way of direct FCC regulation of
EFT systems, and a move in that direction is highly unlikely. EFT
systems may benefit from the experience of communication regulation,
though, regardless of the authority of the FCC. Certain aspects of
common carrier regulation as it has evolved in this country provide a
model for enforcing access to EFT systems by various members of
the financial industry, first, by providing a way in which information
about available projects can be publicized, and secondly, by creating
a uniform system of accounting by which discrimination in the cost
of participation can be reduced.
The financial industry should also be interested and involved in
the outcome of the interconnection issue, for it will indirectly influ-
ence the development of EFT systems. In particular, as the NCEFT
and various state legislatures weigh the merits of adopting or reject-
ing the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of "branch bank,"
they might consider the communications implications, as well as the
banking implications, of a system of intrastate EFT systems.
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